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ABSTRACT Collecting data via a questionnaire and analyzing them while preserving respondents’ privacy
may increase the number of respondents and the truthfulness of their responses. It may also reduce the
systematic differences between respondents and non-respondents. In this paper, we propose a privacy-
preserving method for collecting and analyzing survey responses using secure multi-party computation. The
method is secure under the semi-honest adversarial model. The proposed method computes a wide variety
of statistics. Total and stratified statistical counts are computed using the secure protocols developed in this
paper. Then, additional statistics, such as a contingency table, a chi-square test, an odds ratio, and logistic
regression, are computed within the R statistical environment using the statistical counts as building blocks.
The method was evaluated on a questionnaire data set of 3158 respondents sampled for a medical study
and simulated questionnaire data sets of up to 50 000 respondents. The computation time for the statistical
analyses linearly scales as the number of respondents increases. The results show that the method is efficient
and scalable for practical use. It can also be used for other applications in which categorical data are collected.
INDEX TERMS Bloom filter, privacy, questionnaire, statistical analysis, secure multi-party computation,
secret sharing.
I. INTRODUCTION
Surveys are a commonly used tool in many research areas.
For example, public health researchers use surveys to study
the health conditions of a given population, as well as to
measure public opinion regarding the healthcare services.
In addition to the health data collected at health institutions,
individuals collect data, such as health and physical activity
data, using mobile applications and sensors. These data have
high potential for public health and clinical research [1].
In this paper, we consider collecting data via a question-
naire as an example of research data collected from individu-
als. The reliability of the statistical analyses of questionnaire
data depends on the availability of a sufficient number of par-
ticipants. The analyses also depend on the representativeness
of the participants and the truthfulness of the data provided by
the participants. However, disclosure of sensitive or private
information to a third party may discourage participation and
reduce the response rate. Nonresponse may induce nonre-
sponse bias as a result of systematic differences between
individuals who participate and individuals who do not [2].
Privacy risks may also compel participants to provide inaccu-
rate responses. Therefore, privacy preserving data collection
and analyses may promote participation and increase the
accuracy of the data [3].
A simple method for collecting data via a questionnaire
involves a trusted third-party (TTP) that collects the data from
participants and de-identifies the collected data set before
disclosing the data to the data analyst (researcher). Survey-
Monkey [4] and questback [5] use the same method to pro-
vide anonymized questionnaire data. The privacy protection
depends on the de-identification technique and the security of
the TTP. Any failure in the TTP incurs high privacy risks.
Secure multi-party computation (SMC) deals with the
problem of a set of parties who wish to compute a certain
function on their private data without revealing any private
information apart from the output of the computation [6]–[8].
However, only a few SMC protocols have been devel-
oped for collecting and computing of categorical vari-
ables, which are the common type of data collected with a
questionnaire [9]–[11]. These protocols have limitations for
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practical uses, such as privacy and scalability as the number
of participating parties increases.
With the purpose of providing a practical method, in this
paper we propose a privacy-preserving method for collecting
and analyzing questionnaire data based on secret sharing [12]
and Bloom filter [13]. The method contains SMC protocols
for computing total and stratified statistical counts. Then,
additional statistics, such as a contingency table, a chi-square
test, an odds ratio, and logistic regression, are locally com-
puted within the R statistical environment [14] using statisti-
cal counts as the building blocks. Moreover, we show that the
method is secure under the semi-honest adversarymodel [15],
where the adversary follows a protocol but may try to learn
private information from the messages exchanged during the
protocol execution. Theoretical and experimental evaluations
demonstrated that the method is suitable for practical use.
II. USE CASE
The use case in this paper is the PAtients’
TrAjectories (PAsTAs) project. The project aimed to study the
relationship between healthcare services consumption and
the satisfaction of patients with chronic conditions with the
coordination of the healthcare services they had received. The
study was approved by the Regional Committee for Medical
and Health Research Ethics in central Norway (2011/2047).
The project selected a random sample of 12 502 patients
with chronic conditions using health data collected by general
practitioners, hospitals, and municipalities in central Norway.
The patients were 18 years and older and used at least one
somatic healthcare service in 2012 and 2013.
A questionnaire was sent to the selected patients, and
3158 (25.3%) patients completed it. The questionnaire vari-
ables used to evaluate the method developed in this paper
are (1) nominal variables, such as education, health status,
and whether the respondents live alone, and (2) ordinal
variables (on a Likert scale), such as satisfaction with the
coordination of care. In addition, we used gender and age
group data extracted from the respondents’ healthcare service
providers, which are nominal and interval variables, respec-
tively. See Appendix A for details.
III. PROBLEM DEFINITION
Assume a cohort of N individuals who completed ques-
tionnaire Q for a particular study. The participants are
denoted by P = {p1, p2, . . . , pN }, where pi denotes
an individual identified with a unique identifier1 i.
The questionnaire consists of n questions denoted by
Q = {Q1,Q2, . . . ,Qn}, where Qj has K distinct possible
answers denoted by Qj = {aj1, a
j
2, . . . , a
j
K }. The answers
may have nominal, ordinal, or interval values. Qj can be a
1The unique identifier does not have to be a regional or national unique
identifier. It is sufficient that the identifier is unique within a survey. The
unique identifier can be generated using different techniques depending on
the survey design. For example, in the context of the use case presented in
this paper, the researchers can generate identifiers to the recruited patients
and send the identifier together with the invitation to the survey.
multiple-response question. However, for the sake of simplic-
ity of presentation, we describe the method proposed in this
paper assumingQj has a single response denoted by a
j
l , where
l 2 {1, 2, . . . ,K }.
The problem addressed in this paper is to design a method
for collecting questionnaire responses and analyzing the
responses while protecting the respondents’ privacy.
IV. BACKGROUND
In this section, we present the building blocks for the method
proposed in this paper.
A. SECRET SHARING SCHEME
Secret sharing is a commonly used building block in SMC.
The most common secret sharing scheme includes addi-
tive and Shamir’s secret sharing schemes. In general, it is
a method by which a secret value is split into L shares.
Additive secret sharing scheme requires all shares to recon-
struct the secret value, whereas Shamir’s secret sharing
requires a threshold number of shares [12].
The shares of a secret value s 2 Z2p are denoted as
JsK = (s1, s2, . . . , sL), where Z2p is a finite ring of p-bit
integers, and s = PLi=1 si mod 2p. For example, in additive
secret sharing, the shares are computed by selecting L   1
random values si 2 Z2p , where i 2 {1, 2, . . . ,L   1}, and sL
is computed as sL = s 
PL 1
i=1 si mod 2
p [12].
Additive and Shamir’s secret sharing are linear secret shar-
ing schemes. Therefore, they have homomorphic property for
addition, subtraction, and multiplication by a public constant
value [16]. Let us assume two secret values x and y and their
secret shared values denoted by JxK = (x1, x2, . . . , xL) and
JyK = (y1, y2, . . . , yL), respectively. The addition of x and y
can be computed on their secret shared values by adding each
pair of shares, Jx+yK = (x1+y1, x2+y2, . . . , xL+yL). Secret
share subtraction between x and y is also computed similarly.
The output shares Jx+yK are independent of the input shares.
Therefore, revealing Jx+ yK to a third party does not disclose
any information about x and y.
Linear secret sharing schemes are not multiplicatively
homomorphic [16]. Therefore, complex protocols are devel-
oped for secret share multiplication [17].We denote the secret
share multiplication of x and y by Jx ⇤ yK.
B. BLOOM FILTER
The Bloom filter (BF) is an efficient data structure that
encodes a set X of n elements [13]. BF is an array that is m
long, and each array position is a one-bit counter. We denote
this array as BF = {c1, c2, . . . , cm}. It supports the insertion
and membership query of an element x 2 X . Each operation
requires O(1) time.
The insertion and membership query of x is performed
using k hash functions Hi(.), where 1  i  k .
First, the hash of x is computed, using each hash function
Hi (x). Second, modulo m of each hash value is computed,
bi (x) = Hi (x) mod m, to get k array positions of BF ,
bi (x) 2 [0,m  1]. Then, x is inserted into BF by setting all
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the counters at positions bi(x) of the array to 1. Similarly, x is
concluded to be a non-member of BF if at least one counter
at one of the positions bi(x) of the array is 0.
A membership query result can be a false positive due to
a hash collision that occurs when all the array positions of
BF associated with x have been set to 1 as a result of the
insertion of other elements. After n elements are inserted
into BF using the optimal number of hash functions, the
probability that a membership query returns a false positive
is P (false positive) ⇡ (0.6185)m/n [18].
V. RELATED WORK
In this section, we review secure methods for computing
categorical data collected by individuals, which is also the
focus of this paper. We also review secure methods for com-
puting data distributed across data custodians using the same
computation model as in this paper. The review focuses on
methods that are secure against the semi-honest adversarial
model.
Bogetoft et al. [19] presented a method for a secure dou-
ble auction based on Shamir’s secret sharing scheme [20]
with three semi-honest third parties that collect and analyze
the secret shares of bidders’ bids. Several similar methods
have been proposed for a wide variety of statistical com-
putations, such as SHAREMIND [21], SEPIA [22], and
Chida et al.’s [9] methods. The methods have a similar
computation model with different secret sharing schemes
and numbers of semi-honest third parties. The methods pro-
posed by Bogetoft at al. [19], Bogdanov et al. [21], and
Burkhart et al. [22] are for computing numerical variables,
whereas the method proposed in [9] contains protocols for
computing both numerical and categorical variables.
The protocol implemented in [9] for computing categorical
data is based on a random shuffle protocol [23] in which the
semi-honest third parties randomly shuffle the secret shares
of the required variables. Then, the data analyst collects and
processes the result to find the number of individuals in each
category.
Drosatos and Efraimidis [10] proposed a method for dis-
tributed statistical computation of biomedical sensor data
using Paillier Homomorphic encryption [24] where a per-
sonal software agent aggregates individuals’ data through the
exchange of encrypted data in a ring or tree topology. The
proposed method supports computation of categorical and
numeric variables.
Chen et al. [11] proposed a method for statistical count of
categorical data distributed across individuals, and the com-
putation results satisfy the differential privacy model [25].
In this method, the individuals send their responses and
random noises encrypted using bit encryption [26] and the
analyst’s public key to a semi-honest third party. The third
party also blindly inserts bit-encrypted noises and sends them
to the data analyst. Then, the data analyst decrypts and finds
the statistical count.
The methods proposed in [10] and [11] require the devices
used by the participating individuals to be online during
the computation. However, the same set of individuals may
not be online during consecutive computations on mobile
devices due to limited computation resources and network
connection. Thus, consecutive statistical computations may
not give comparable results. Depending on the selection pol-
icy for participants, it may take a long time until all the
selected individuals go online. The method proposed in [10]
also requires communication between the participants’
devices. As a result, both methods have a long runtime that
limits the scalability of the methods to a large number of
participants.
VI. MATERIALS AND METHODS
In this section, we present the requirements of the method
developed in this paper as well as the design, threat model,
and sub-protocols.
A. REQUIREMENTS
Based on our experience, the following requirements are
specified for a method that collects and analyzes question-
naire data while protecting respondents’ privacy.
1) R1 SECURITY
The method should be secure against realistic adversarial
attacks, and the security should be proved using a for-
mal security analysis. The basic security properties are the
following:
PRIVACY
No party should learn private information about the respon-
dents based on their participation in a survey. It should be
possible to query only the statistics in the questionnaire data.
CORRECTNESS
The statistical results must be accurate or have acceptable
level of accuracy.
2) R2 EFFICIENCY AND SCALABILITY
We assumed that the respondents complete a questionnaire
online on mobile or stationary devices under their control.
From now on, we refer to these devices as clients. These
clients have heterogeneous computation resources. For exam-
ple, the mobile devices may have constraints on computation
resources (e.g., CPU and battery life) and network connec-
tivity. Therefore, the method should tolerate clients that may
shut down and go offline anytime. In addition, the clients’
local computation requirement should be efficient so that
even clients with limited computational power are able to
complete the entire process.
SMC protocols that involve bi-directional communication
between clients may not be completed or may require a long
computation time if at least one of the clients is offline.
Since a large number of respondents are often required in
public health surveys, the computation time may increase
significantly with the number of clients. Therefore, SMC
protocols should scale with a large number of clients.
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In addition, direct communication between clients requires
knowledge of each other. This raises privacy concerns when
participating in a survey reveals sensitive information based
on the membership of the participants in the survey, which
is called membership disclosure. Of course, anonymous
communication protocols [27] can be used to maintain par-
ticipants’ anonymity, but these protocols add extra communi-
cation rounds to a computation.
3) R3 USABILITY
Data analysts use certain familiar statistical computation
tools, such as R. Therefore, the method should allow analysts
to work with familiar tools.
B. SECRET SHARED BLOOM FILTER
Once a respondent pi completes the questionnaire, her
response for each question Qj is coded as a
j
l . The codes
for all responses are inserted into a Bloom filter denoted
as BFi. Then, each counter value of BFi = {c1, c2, . . . , cm}
is secret shared as shown in Fig. 1. The secret share of
counter ck of BFi is denoted as JckK = (ck1, ck2, . . . , ckL),
where k 2 [1,m]. The secret share of BFi is denoted as
JBFiK = (BFi1,BFi2, . . . ,BFiL), and each share is denoted
by BFij = {c1j , c2j , . . . , cmj }, where ckj contains a share of the
counter ck of BFi.
FIGURE 1. Secret share of Bloom filter BFi that encodes the responses of
respondent pi .
C. ARCHITECTURAL DESIGN
The architectural design of the method proposed in this paper
is shown in Fig. 2. It contains three components: N clients,
L data miners, and the R statistical environment. Each client
runs on the respondent’s device used to complete the ques-
tionnaire. A data miner is a third party that satisfies the threat
model described in section VI-D. A data analyst works within
the R statistical environment to analyze the questionnaire
data.
Each client encodes a respondent’s responses as secret
shared Bloom filters and distributes them to the data min-
ers together with the respondent’s unique identifier. The
data miners store the secret shared Bloom filters locally.
They are blind to the respondents’ answers; however,
they jointly compute the secure protocols proposed
in section VI-E to answer a data analyst’s statistical query.
The data analyst uses the R package developed in this paper
to make statistical queries against the secret shared Bloom
filters. We refer to these queries as private queries, because
the queries are computed on individual-level responses.
In contrast, public queries are locally computed within R on
the results of private queries.
D. THREAT MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
We assumed that respondents create valid secret share Bloom
filters. However, for some surveys, malicious respondents
may create corrupted secret shared Bloom filters to alter
the accuracy of the surveys’ statistical outputs. Therefore,
in Appendix B, we discuss how a malicious respondent could
try to alter statistical outputs, and propose a secure and very
efficient protocol for verifying whether a respondent’s secret
shared Bloom filters are legitimate.
We considered a semi-honest (honest-but-curious) adver-
sarial model in which the data miners follow a protocol
specification using the correct secret shared Bloom filters.
However, the data miners might try to use the messages
exchanged in the protocol to learn private information.
We assumed that there exists a secret share multiplication
protocol that is secure under the semi-honest adversarial
model. We also assumed that the protocol is universally
composable [28] in which multiple executions of the protocol
remain secure.
We assumed that communications between two entities
that participate in a protocol are secure. Therefore, an adver-
sary cannot read messages sent between two entities and the
integrity of the messages is verified.
During the execution of the secure protocols, we assumed
that the communications between the data miners are asyn-
chronous. Therefore, sending and receiving a message may
take an arbitrary amount of time. However, we assumed that
there is no message loss as fault tolerance is beyond the scope
of the paper.
E. SECURE MULTI-PARTY COMPUTATION PROTOCOLS
In this section, we presented the sub-protocols we developed
for analyzing the respondents’ answers, while preserving the
respondents’ privacy.
1) SECURE PROTOCOLS FOR THE LOGICAL OPERATORS
Let us consider the counters ck and ck+1 of BFi, which have
binary (1 or 0) values. Their secret shares JckK and Jck+1K,
respectively, are distributed across the dataminers. Let us also
assume that a secret share of 1 is distributed across the data
miners. In this section, we describe protocols for computing
the logical operators, such as AND, OR, and NOT, of the
secret shared values. The result of the protocols after com-
puting the logical operators is a secret share of 1 distributed
across the data miners when the expression is true, and 0
otherwise.
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FIGURE 2. Architectural design of the privacy-preserving questionnaire method.
The logical AND of ck and ck+1 can be computed on
their secret shared values using a secret share multiplication
protocol.
The logical OR of ck and ck+1 can be described as
(ck + ck+1)   (ck ⇤ ck+1). Thus, the data miners jointly
compute the logical OR on their secret shared values using a
combination of the secret share addition, multiplication, and
subtraction protocols.
The logical NOT of ck can be described as (1  ck ). Thus,
the data miners compute the logical NOT on the secret share
value of ck and 1 using only the secret share subtraction
protocol.
2) SECURE COUNT PROTOCOL
Let us consider question Qj of the questionnaire and its
answer ajl . The objective of the secure count protocol is to find
a secret shared value JnK of the number of respondents who
chose ajl . For example, the query can be finding the number
of female respondents.
The responses of all survey participants are distributed
across the data miners as a secret shared Bloom filter JBFiK,





2 [0,m  1], where h 2 {1, 2, . . . , k} and
k is the number of hash functions.




, the data miners execute
the secret share addition protocol of the counter values for all
participants’ secret shared Bloom filters. We denote the result
as JchK, which is a secret shared value distributed across the
data miners. The results of the entire counter positions are
denoted as JcK = {Jc1K, Jc2K, . . . JckK}. The minimum value
of JcK is equal to JnK [29].
3) SECURE MEMBERSHIP QUERY PROTOCOL
The objective of the protocol is to find a secret shared value
Jrjl,iK that is equal to 1, if a
j
l is a member of BFi (in other
words, the respondent pi answered a
j
l), and 0 otherwise. For
example, the protocol can be used to identify whether pi is
a female. However, the result is secret shared between the
data miners so that no one learns any information about the
gender of pi.
ajl is considered a non-member of BFi if at least one of the
positions bh(a
j
l) is 0. Therefore, as presented in Algorithm 1,
Algorithm 1 SecureMembershipQuery (JBFiK, ajl)
Input: The counter positions {b1, b2, . . . , bk} of ajl
in JBFiK
Output: Secret shared value Jrjl,iK of 1 if a
j
l exists in BFi,
and 0 otherwise.
//the data miners run the secure logical AND protocol
Jrjl,iK = Jc(b1) ⇤ c(b2)K
for h = 3 to k do
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of JBFiK is equal to Jrjl,iK.
The protocol is extended to perform a secure non-
membership query of whether pi did not answer a
j
l . This query
is computed using the logical NOT protocol on the result of
the membership query Jrjl,iK.
The protocols for logical operators can be used to join the
results of multiple membership queries with logical opera-
tors, such as AND and OR. For example, we may want to
query whether pi is female AND > 65 years old. No one
learns about the result, as it is secret shared.
Let us consider answers ajl and a
j+1
l to questions
Qj and Qj+1, respectively. The membership queries of
ajl and a
j+1





tively. For example, a query about whether pi answered
ajl and a
j+1
l can be computed by executing the logical AND
protocol on Jrjl,iK and Jr
j+1
l,i K.
In general, any query criteria can be build by concatenating
the logical operators, and the secret share of the result of a
query on the responses of pi is denoted as JriK.
4) SECURE CONDITIONAL COUNT PROTOCOL
The objective of the secure conditional count protocol is
to find a secret shared value JnK of the number of indi-
viduals who satisfy a conditional query criteria, without
revealing an individual’s query results. An example query
can be the number of respondents who are female AND
> 65 years old.
The protocol computes as follows. First, for each respon-
dent pi, the data miners execute the query using the secure
membership query protocol. Second, they compute secret
share addition protocol of the query result JriK, where
i 2 {1, 2, . . . ,N }, for all respondents, which gives the secret
shared value JnK.
VII. STATISTICAL COMPUTATIONS
The appropriate statistical analyses for questionnaire data
depend on the objectives of the survey and the types of
variables used in the questionnaire, such as nominal, ordinal,
and interval.
As described in section VI-E-2 and VI-E-4, the results of
the secure count and secure conditional count protocols are
secret shared between the data miners. Then, the data miners
send their shares to the R package that constructs the count
values. These results are total and stratified statistical counts,
respectively. As described next, a wide variety of statistical
analyses can be computed using the statistical counts as
building blocks.
The frequency table of a variable can be created by query-
ing the total statistical count of each category of the variable.
For an interval variable, it is possible to compute statistics,
such as average, variance, and standard deviation, based on
the frequency table.
A contingency table (cross-tabulation) of two or more cat-
egorical variables can be constructed by computing stratified
TABLE 1. A contingency table of gender and age group.
statistical counts of each combination of the answers of the
variables. Table 1 shows a 2 ⇥ 4 contingency table of age
group and gender, where cell ni,j is the number of respondents
who chose the values of row i and column j.
Statistics, such as a chi-square test and an odds ratio, can be
computed on contingency tables. Logistic regression can also
be computed on a multi-way contingency table for a binary
or dichotomous outcome variable, which has two categories.
Similarly, multinomial logistic regression can be computed
for an outcome variable that has more than two categories.
VIII. RESULTS
A. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we prove the security for the protocols
based on the threat model and the assumptions described
in section VI.D.
Theorem 1 The secure count protocol is secure for semi-
honest data miners.
Proof: The security proof of the protocol is simple
following the security of the secret sharing scheme.
The protocol uses the homomorphic addition property of
linear secret sharing schemes. Therefore, the protocol is
secure, as the secret sharing scheme is secure. In the case of
the additive secret sharing scheme, the protocol is secure with
a collusion of up to L   1 dishonest data miners.
Theorem 2 The secure conditional count protocol is secure
for semi-honest data miners.
Proof: The security proof of the protocol is simple
following the universal composability theorem.
The notion of universal composability allows us to reduce
the security proof of the protocol to the security proof of its
sub-protocols. Multiple executions of a universally compos-
able protocol remain secure [28]. The protocol uses homo-
morphic addition and subtraction properties of a linear secret
sharing scheme and a multiplication protocol. Therefore, the
secure membership query protocol and the protocols for the
logical operators are secure for a universally composable
secret share multiplication protocol. Consequently, the secure
conditional count protocol is secure, and it provides the same
security guarantee as the multiplication protocol.
As a result, the protocols successfully protect the respon-
dents’ privacy. Therefore, the method satisfies requirement
R1 (Security).
B. IMPLEMENTATION
We implemented a prototype of the proposed method in Java.
The method is agnostic to a linear secret sharing scheme
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and a secret share multiplication protocol. However, the pro-
totype was implemented using the additive secret sharing
scheme and the multiplication protocol proposed in [17]. The
multiplication protocol was designed for three data miners.
It has been shown that the protocol is universally composable
under the semi-honest adversarial model. Consequently, all
experiments performed in this paper used three data miners.
As we did not run a survey, the questionnaire data used in
the experiments were stored in a csv file, where each record is
an individual’s questionnaire response. Therefore, to emulate
the client application, we created a simple client that encoded
each record of a csv file as secret shared Bloom filters of a
respondent and distributed the secret shared Bloom filters to
the data miners.
The format of a secret shared Bloom filter varies with the
survey design, such as the questionnaire and the expected
number of participants. Thus, a data miner could simply store
a secret shared Bloom filter in a relational database as a
text. However, it will require the data miners to process the
whole secret shared Bloom filter, although a given query
is computed only on the counter values at specific counter
positions. Therefore, our implementation of data miners used
Redis as a database and the Jedis client for persisting and
querying secret shared Bloom filters [30]. The array of a
secret shared Bloom filter was stored as a list using the
respondent identifier as a key.
We developed an R package (SecureStat) that contains
functions, such as sec.count() and sec.conditional.count(),
for the secure statistical count and conditional count queries.
We assumed that data analysts are familiar with the R statisti-
cal environment and perform further statistical computations
of the results of secure counts using existing R packages.
We used the JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) for-
mat for message communication. The JSON messages were
sent through the Extensible Messaging and Presence Proto-
col (XMPP) [31]. Each entity used an XMPP client to connect
to a local XMPP server. Then, a message between two entities
was sent through a server-to-server connection. All messages
were compressed using the Lz4 [32] lossless compression
algorithm to reduce the overall size. After transmission, each
message was decompressed before actual use.
C. ANALYTICAL EVALUATION
A protocol is efficient if it is able to compute with good
performance, which is often expressed by the communication
(i.e., communication rounds and size of messages) and com-
putation complexity. Scalability is measured in terms of the
change in efficiency as the number of participants increases.
The secure count protocol does not require communication
between the dataminers. The local computation performed by
a dataminer is simple arithmetic that is linear with the number
of survey respondents (N ), number of hash functions (k), and
the number of bits p of the secret shares.
The conditional count protocol uses a secure multiplica-
tion protocol that requires communication between the data
miners. The size of the messages is linear with the values
of N , k , and p. For query criteria that contain v variables,
the number of multiplications is equal to (k ⇤ v)   1. The
value of k can be minimized by increasing the expected
number of elements n of the Bloom filter for the same false
positive probability. As a result, the number ofmultiplications
significantly reduces.
The client encodes a respondent’s answers as a Bloom
filter and then secret shares each array position of the Bloom
filter, which is computationally very efficient. The size of the
message a client sends to data miners is linear with the Bloom
filter parameters. The number of messages sent by a client is
equal to the number of data miners, which is very few.
D. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We deployed the prototype in a local area network connected
through a Gigabit switch. The data miners were deployed
on three machines equipped with Intel i3-5010U dual core
2.10GHz CPUs, 8GB RAM, and Windows 10 Pro. The client
and the R statistical environment were deployed on an Intel
dual core i7 2.9 GHz CPU, 8GB RAM and Mac 10.10.5.
We ran experiments to evaluate the runtime of the protocol
to compute a statistical count and a 3 ⇥ 6 contingency table.
Each experiment was run 20 times, and the average runtime
was recorded. The parameters used for the experiments are
presented in Appendix C.
We ran the first experiments on the questionnaire data set
of 3158 respondents described in section II. The runtime of a
statistical count completed within 0.4 seconds. A query of a
3⇥6 contingency table was completed within 5.437 seconds.
To evaluate the scalability of the proposed method, the
second experiment was run on simulated questionnaire data
sets of up to 50 000 respondents. Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 illustrate
the total runtime of a statistical count and a 3 ⇥ 6 contin-
gency table query, respectively, as the number of respondents
increases.
FIGURE 3. The total runtime of a statistical count query as the number of
respondents increases.
We also ran experiments to evaluate of the size of message
and the computation times of a client as the number of ques-
tions on the questionnaire increases. Table 2 shows the size
of the message a client sends to a data miner. Fig. 5 shows the
client’s computation time.
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FIGURE 4. The total runtime of a 3 ⇥ 6 contingency table query as
the number of respondents increases.
TABLE 2. The size of the message a client sends to a data miner as
the number of questions increases.
FIGURE 5. The computation time of a client as the number of questions
of the questionnaire increases.
IX. DISCUSSION
We designed and evaluated a secure method for collecting
and analyzing questionnaire data. The proposed method pro-
tects respondents’ privacy under the semi-honest adversarial
model, and the computation results were correct. Therefore,
the method satisfies requirement R1.
Unlike the methods proposed in [10] and [11], the com-
putation model of the method does not require a client to
be online after the respondent completes the questionnaire
and the responses are distributed to the data miners as secret
sharedBloomfilters.When a client goes offline or shuts down
before completing the questionnaire or distributing the secret
shared Bloom filters, the task can be completed anytime
within the survey’s data collection period or the individual
will be considered a non-respondent. In addition, our method
does not require peer-to-peer communication between clients
in contrast to the method proposed in [10].
The experimental results showed that the proposed pro-
tocols for statistical analyses are efficient, and they linearly
scale with the addition of respondents. The runtime of the
protocols are significantly faster than the protocols proposed
in [10] and [11]. The runtime of our protocols are comparable
to the protocols implemented in [9], but our protocol for
creating a contingency has security advantage as discussed
later.
In addition, in our method, the computation complexity of
a client is very minimal that makes it suitable for usage on
mobile devices. Therefore, requirement R2 is satisfied.
An R package was developed for the secure statistical
count and conditional count queries of the secret shared data
distributed across data miners. Various statistics are com-
puted within R using the statistical count as a building block.
Requirement R3 was satisfied as the method allows a data
analyst to work within a familiar environment. In addition,
the use of R as a front-end tool avoided the need to implement
advanced statistics.
The paper discussed the proposed method in terms of ques-
tionnaire data. However, the method can be used for other
data sources, such as mobile application and medical sensor
data, where the types of variables are nominal, interval, and
ordinal.
The client application can be implemented as a web or
mobile application. Bogdanov and Talviste [33] discussed the
state of the art for web technologies for privacy-preserving
computations.
The method proposed in the paper is secure for any entities
selected as data miners as long as they satisfy the threat
model. Data miners cannot be able to obtain an individual’s
personal information, even if they try to do so. However, prac-
tical uses of the method require public awareness of how the
method works and how much privacy protection is provided.
The use of public entities trusted by the community, such
as healthcare institutions, patient organizations, and privacy
advocates, as data miners may also increase public trust.
The business process of running a survey using this
privacy-preserving method will not be much different from
existing online survey systems. The proposed method starts
with a survey design that includes the preparation of a
questionnaire and coding the questions (see Appendix A
for the questionnaire used in the experiments). The sur-
vey design also includes setting the appropriate parameters
(see Appendix C for the parameters used in the experiments).
Participants are invited and data are collected after the survey
is designed. During the data collection phase, data analysts
may be interested only in querying the number of respon-
dents. However, after the data collection phase is completed,
data analysts run statistical analyses.
The security analysis proved that the protocols proposed
in this paper are secure. In general, SMC protocols compute
without revealing any information apart from the compu-
tation results. However, the computation results might lead
to inferential disclosure given prior knowledge and repeated
queries. In the following sections we present techniques that
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can be used in our method to avoid or minimize inferential
disclosure. However, the methods presented in [9] and [10]
lacks inferential disclosure techniques.
Query restriction techniques are developed in the statistical
database research area to limit inferential disclosure, where
queries that can lead to a compromise are denied [34]. For
example, SHRINE, a distributed health research network,
limits the smallest value of a statistical count query result to
ten [35]. In our method, a secret share less than protocol [17]
can be used to evaluate whether results of secure count and
secure conditional count protocols is less than the threshold t ,
which gives a secret share of 1 if the count is less than t , and 0
otherwise. Therefore, it is possible to extend our method to
make sure that statistical counts of less than t are not returned
to a data analyst.
Perturbation techniques were also developed to limit infer-
ential disclosure techniques, by adding noise into the query
results in a way that protects individuals’ privacy [34].
The method proposed in [11] uses the differential privacy
model [25] for inferential disclosure limitation. For our exper-
iments, we chose a small false positive probability that led
to computation of the exact statistical results. However, it is
possible to use the false positive probability of the Bloom
filter, which is selected during the survey design phase, as
a parameter to insert noise into the statistical results.
In the current implementation of the secure questionnaire
method, statistical counts are returned to a data analyst who
performs additional analysis on the statistical count results.
However, as the results of the secure count and secure con-
ditional count protocols are secret shared, advanced statisti-
cal computations can be implemented without revealing the
intermediate results. Therefore, inferential disclosures can be
minimized or avoided.
X. CONCLUSION
The privacy-preserving method proposed in this paper is effi-
cient and scalable for practical use. The method may increase
the number of survey respondents and the accuracy of their
responses. The method may also minimize or avoid the non-
respondent bias that occurs as a result of differences between
survey respondents and non-respondents. However, further
research is required to measure the effects of this method on
a survey compared to existing anonymous survey method.
Currently, the prototype was evaluated between data min-
ers connected through a local area network. We plan to
evaluate this method with data miners connected through the
Internet. In addition, we plan to enhance the prototype with
the techniques discussed in Section IX for avoiding statistical
disclosures.
APPENDIX A
In this appendix, we present the subset of the questionnaire
of the PAsTAs project that was used to evaluate the method
presented in this paper. The questionnaire was originally in
Norwegian. However, we present an English translation of
the questions. In addition, the questions are coded according
to the notations described in section III.




Q2. What is your age?
a21. <18 a
2
2. Between 18 and 45
a23. Between 46 and 65 a
2
4. >65
Q3. What is the highest education you have completed?
a31. Primary education
a32. Lower secondary education
a33. Upper secondary education
a34. Less than 4 years college/university education
a35. Four years or more college/university education










Q6. Think of the health services you have received in 2012
and 2013 and indicate your level of agreement with the
following statement:









A malicious respondent may try to affect the accuracy of a
survey’s statistical analysis results although it is not possible
to get any other benefit (e.g., cannot learn other respondents’
private information). The array positions of a Bloom filter
are set to 1 based on a respondent’s answers, and 0 other-
wise. However, a respondent may create a corrupted Bloom
filter with all the array positions set to 1. Consequently, the
secret shared Bloom filters generated from the Bloom filter
become corrupted. Such corruption of a malicious respondent
increases the result of a statistical count by only one, which
is not significant in most applications.
A statistical count of the questionnaire data will be sig-
nificantly distorted if the array positions of the Bloom filter
are set to large values. A zero-knowledge range proof [36]
can be used to protect against such attacks as a verifier will
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be able to confirm that each array position of a respondent’s
Bloom filter is either 0 or 1. However, zero-knowledge proofs
are computationally expensive.
As an alternative, we propose a simple and efficient pro-
tocol for identifying the corrupted Bloom filter of a mali-
cious respondent and consequently, remove his secret shared
Bloom filters from the survey. For a given survey design, it is
possible to estimate the maximum number of array positions
of a Bloom filter that can be set to 1, and we denote it as M .
For each secret shared Bloom filter JBFiK, the data miners
execute the secret share addition of all counter values, which
approximates a secret share of the number of array positions
that have value 1 denoted as JMiK. The data miners exchange
the shares of JMiK to reconstructMi. Finally, each data miner
locally evaluates whetherMi  M and verifies that the secret
shared Bloom filter is legitimate.
APPENDIX C
Kirsch and Mitzenmacher [37] demonstrated that any BF
can be effectively implemented with only two hash functions
H1(x) and H2(x). The k counter positions of the k hash
functions are simulated with the form bi(x) = (H1 (x) +
iH2(x)) mod m without affecting the false positive probabil-
ity. A hash functionH (.) and two secret keys k1 and k2 can be
used to instantiate the hash values of the two hash functions
as follows, H1(x) = H (k1 k x) and H2(x) = H (k2 k x).
The hash function can be a non-cryptographic hash function,
which is more efficient than cryptographic hash functions.
For all the experiments in this paper we used MurmurHash 2,
which is a non-cryptographic hash function.
For all the experiments, we chose the number of
hash functions k = 1 and false positive probability
P (false positive) = 0.01. The expected number of elements
is equal to the number of questions of questionnaire n. Then,
we chose a Bloom filter size m that provides the false pos-
itive probability of P (false positive) = 0.01 for a given
n and k = 1.
We also used secret sharing with a finite ring of inte-
gers Z2p , where p = 16. Therefore, the result of a statistical
count query is a 16-bit integer. The upper bound of the
result of a statistical count query is equal to the number of
survey participants N . Therefore, the number of bits p should
be able to represent N . Let us consider N = 50 000 and
question Q6 of the questionnaire presented in Appendix A.
In an ideal scenario, all respondents were satisfied with
the healthcare services they had received and responded:
‘‘Completely agree.’’ Consequently, a statistical count of the
number of respondents who ‘‘Completely’’ satisfied with
the healthcare services they had received is 50,000, which
requires 16-bit.
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